Abstract / This is a commentary regarding the role new technologies may have to play in the mobilization of civil society in Greece; it discusses two street protests against the wildfires that consumed large parts of the country during the summer of 2007, which were initiated via online technologies. It concludes that, despite the recent mobilization of large parts of Greek society in December 2008, also accelerated via the use of new media, the Greek citizenry has yet to prove that it can effectively and consistently over time remain motivated about the environment. In that respect, the street protests under consideration may be seen as nothing more than activist pyrotechnics, facilitated and sexed-up by new ICTs. Therefore, new technologies, on their own, have a limited scope for political mobilization unless there is a supporting and contextual environment that promotes and sustains their impact.
New Technologies and Modern Politics
The democratizing potential of new technologies, and the risks and opportunities these provide for democratic engagement, have long been debated, while the emergence of a vast body of research on 'digital democracy' and its variants points to an interest about the effects of ICTs on civic and political participation. 2 The pervasive estrangement between representatives and those represented, manifest in the majority of western democracies through falling voter turnout, lower levels of participation in civic life, public cynicism towards political parties and institutions, indicate that modern democracies experience an atrophy of political engagement (Coleman and Gøtze, 2002: 3) -another facet of Robert Putnam's (2000) theory of social capital. While some read growing levels of apathy into this (Coleman, 2007) , others distinguish between the 'disaffection perspective' (people are disaffected as demonstrated in the low voter turnout, reluctance in DEBATE joining political parties, and low opinion of politicians amongst them) and that of 'cultural displacement' (Loader, 2007) . In the latter, (young) people are not disaffected, rather, they are displaced from formal politics. New platforms of political expression such as Myspace, Facebook, Flickr and blogs, indicate that new network spaces of political efficacy and engagement are being established.
In Greece there is a similar sort of displacement from the traditional political process. A different form of active citizenship is being articulated -this time, within the alternative spaces of online media -that could ideally lead towards a revised and reinvigorated Greek civil society. Taking cue from the barrage of wildfires that took place in the country during the summer of 2007, and the street protests that followed them, I wish to offer a view regarding the role of new technologies in the mobilization of an environmentally friendly civil society in Greece. To what extent can new ICTs, particularly the mobile phone and the internet, be seen to have facilitated an unprecedented mobilization of the Greek civil society, considering the fact that Greece is not a particularly advanced Information Society? Are they powerful enough on their own to contribute towards a strong and robust civil society in Greece or is their role dependent on the support of a wider political environment and culture?
This article will start by contextualizing the Greek Information Society; it will then comment on the existing political culture and civil society in Greece before it embarks on the discussion of the 2007 forest fires that ravaged the country and triggered a unique political mobilization of the Greek public.
Framing the Discussion: The Greek Information Society
Although the Information Society in Greece is increasing in leaps and bounds, the country is still lagging behind compared to the rest of Europe: 30.2 per cent of households had an internet connection at home in Greece as opposed to EU27: 54 per cent and EU15: 59 per cent in 2008 (Measuring the Greek Information Society, 2008) . When it comes to the fast internet, the percentage of broadband penetration has increased from 6.84 per cent in July 2007 to 9.11 per cent in January 2008, while 56 per cent of households with internet connection in 2007 use fast internet. As expected, the higher rates for PC use and internet access are recorded for those aged 16-24 (87%: 75% respectively in 2007), with PC use and internet access being inversely proportional to the age of users; equally expected is the fact that the rate of use is decreasing with age (Measuring the Greek Information Society, 2008) . Comparing PC use and internet access in Greece with the EU27 and EU15 average shows that, with the exception of those aged 16-24, PC use and internet access in Greece is significantly lower than the European average (Identity of Internet users in Greece, 2008) . So while for younger ages, PC and internet technology is evidently part of their culture, the gap between younger and older users becomes paramount. A look at the penetration of mobile technology across age (2008) indicates that in Greece too, as in other countries (Loader, 2007; Matsuda, 2006) , the mobile is an easy-to-use and accessible technology -especially for those over 60. Conversely, the computer and the internet are practically out of limits for them since older generations find their technology threatening and alienating. Mobile technology, here too, is the way forward to bridge the digital divide across the ages.
Contemporary Civil Society in Greece: A Paradoxical Political and NGO Culture
There is a strong feeling of political cynicism and powerlessness among the Greek people who exhibit a waning public trust towards politicians and the political system at large (Demertzis et al., 2008; Panagiotopoulou and Papliakou, 2007; Sotiropoulos, 2007) , regardless of political orientation.
Contemporary political culture in Greece, I argue, demonstrates a low standard of public dialogue as exemplified in the bitter bickering that takes place on television news and current affairs programmes. Broadcast journalism in Greece has either reduced its political content and invested heavily on infotainment (Plios, 2006) , or in the cases where it still plays a crucial part, political content serves a specific political and/or sensationalist logic. In equal measure, the emergence of a strong celebrity culture, as demonstrated in the high audience ratings and proliferation of reality and talent shows on Greek tele vision in the past five years, as well as in the sharp increase of celebrities, artists and socialites joining the ranks of politicians, is yet another indicator of a civil society in a state of crisis. 3 The contradictions embedded within the Greek civil society further complicate the discussion. Some argue that the Greek civil society, although in effect coming of age during the last decade or so, can be traced back to the 19th century, when volunteer organizations in social welfare and health abounded (Frangonikolopoulos, 2007) . Others argue that civil society in Greece is still underdeveloped and skin-deep (Panagiotopoulou, 2003; Sotiropoulos, 2004) , the main reason being the way in which political parties have developed, leaving citizens no other alternative for political participation. It was not until the late 1980s, when the first signs of political alienation and cynicism became apparent, that a number of NGOs, and other civic associations representing public engagement with the public sphere, started to develop (Panagiotopoulou, 2003 (Panagiotopoulou, , 2007 Panagiotopoulou and Papliakou, 2007) , and in that respect, we need to differentiate between the institutionalized, official, and countable, civil society and one that is unofficial, invisible and uncountable (Sotiropoulos, 2004: 146) . 4 The level of autonomy of this newly shaped civil society is also debated: for some, the massive appearance of NGOs in Greece was very much dependent on decisions taken by the state itself to promote such forms of public participation (Afouxenidis et al., 2004: 3) . Most NGOs, prior to the mid-1990s, were actually pressure groups associated with smaller political parties and independent political formations. There were also several civil society organizations with a cultural heritage focus. Once Greece formally joined the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 1997, almost all of them transformed into NGOs while many others were set up for the first time (Frangonikolopoulos, 2003) . In other words, it was a top-down political decision that mainly set the agenda and not a bottom-up process that pushed for such kind of reform (Afouxenidis et al., 2003: 5) . Others argue that during the 1980s and 1990s, the Greek civil society enjoyed a greater level of autonomy from the state, political parties and trade unions alike (Frangonikolopoulos, 2007) . By the end of 1999, there were 2400 registered social welfare organizations (Panagiotidou, 2002) , a quarter of which counted approximately 200,000 volunteers, while in 2004, the Committee for NGOs of the Greek Foreign Affairs Ministry estimated that 31,858 such organizations were active in Greece (Lionarakis, 2004) . This is indeed a remarkable number, significant of the emergence of a new kind of collective action from outside of the state, but whether or not that corresponds to a robust and long-to-be-sustained volunteerism culture is still the object of fervent discussion.
The 2003 European Social Survey (ESS) showed that 15.3 per cent of the Greek public participates exclusively in NGOs, and marks a slight increase in the domain of active participation and volunteerism in Greece. Having said that, approximately 80 per cent of the populace stands systematically clear from any NGO. This is in stark contrast from countries in Northern and Central Europe where NGO participation is an established course of action for the majority of the citizenry (Panagiotopoulou and Papliakou, 2007: 239) . Another paradox, highlighting the embedded contradictions in the Greek civil society, is the fact that despite the unprecedented rate of volunteers during the 2004 Athens Olympics (160,000), which has been hailed as the beginning of a new era for volunteerism in Greece, 'the Greeks care for their fellow citizen only occasionally, or under extenuating circumstances, and during natural disasters' (Panagiotopoulou and Papliakou, 2007: 251) . Either from the youth's (Demertzis et al., 2008: 157-9) or the adult's point of view (Panagiotopoulou, 2003 (Panagiotopoulou, : 123-4, 2007 Study in volunteerism in Greece, 2005: 59-60) , Greeks are notoriously inert towards any kind of collective voluntary action.
Hence, it appears that although there is an availability of volunteerism in Greece, it may not automatically be transformed into concerted collective action. The Athens 2004 Olympics constituted a unique and exceptional event, a 'bright', one-off moment, which may have called upon the national pride of all Greeks in order to be successfully executed, but which at the same time, lacked the capacity to launch a systematic and permanent volunteerism culture in Greece (Demertzis et al., 2008: 164-7) .
If truth be told, despite the cynicism that engulfs the formal political culture in Greece, electoral results from the European and general elections demonstrate that the Greek citizenry participates en masse in it: participation in Euro-elections may have dropped a few points (61.60% in 2004 from 67.28% in 1999), yet voter turnout is deemed high, as it is also in general elections: 74.17 per cent in 1996, 73.28 per cent in 2000, 74.82 per cent in 2004, and 74.14 per cent in 2007. 5 In this article I am arguing in favour of an existing informal political culture in Greece, one that runs parallel to the formal one, can help reinforce the Greek civil society, and is currently being moulded through the use of new online technologies. However, whether or not new technologies are enough to sustain this revamped civil society on their own remains to be seen. In my view, in Greece new technologies establish new network spaces of political engagement (see, for example, Milioni, 2009 ), yet, they possess a limited scope for political mobilization unless there is a supporting and contextual environment that promotes and sustains their impact further. I will now discuss this point.
'Politics of Presence': Political Engagement and Environmental

Sensitivity in Greece
On Friday 29 June 2007, a fire broke out on mount Parnitha -one of the mountains surrounding the Athens basin and a National Park. Over the course of the weekend 29 June-1 July, what started off as a 'controllable' forest fire resulted in one of 'the worse environmental national disasters', annihilating more than 80 per cent of the fauna and flora of Parnitha and affecting the climate of the Athens basin for generations to come. The fire was openly recognized by the media, the public and the government alike as yet another arson attack, most likely set by unscrupulous property developers. The incendiary got out of control as a result of a number of converging factors: lack of proper and timely coordination and communication between government officials and departments once the blaze started, weather conditions conducive to its insurmountable spread, forest land that had remained unattended to by foresters for too long (hence dry scrubs and tree branches as well as waste served as kindling that fed the blaze), lack of designated fire trails; and perhaps one of the gravest mistakes of all times, the gradual replacement of forest rangers by fire fighters (best suited to combat a city conflagration rather than a forest fire) since 1993, a further testimony of governmental negligence when it comes to environmental concerns regardless of which party has been in office.
The Chronicle of a 'Whispering Protest'
In the beginning of the week following the catastrophe in Parnitha (2-3 July 2007), an SMS started to circulate creating huge ripple effects. It read: The text message snowballed and was subsequently picked up by the blogger community, which passed it on as blog entry and email. By Wednesday 4 July, bloggers held a preparatory meeting in Syntagma square in Athens (where the Greek Parliament is) in order to assess what was happening. No one can tell with absolute certainty how this mobile protest kicked off, although according to some reports (Kathimerini, 2007a) , it was an anonymous 25-year-old who started it off by text messaging his friends. Most accounts concur, nevertheless, that this 'call to arms' was not initiated by any political party or organization, as it is usually the norm in Greece. This was a 'people's demonstration', organized initially through mobile technology, subsequently over the internet, and then by word of mouth, and came as a spontaneous reaction from the citizenry of Athens which joined the 'smartmob' (Rheingold, 2002) 6 revolution as others did before them. The absence of any political party banner, claiming the paternity of this initiative, unique in its nature, of political mobilization in Greece, and the police were conspicuous. However, this protest was different in more ways than one: it affected and involved everyone within the citizenry regardless of age, social class, or political orientation. As long as people cared about what happened in Parnitha, they felt there was rightfully a place for them in Syntagma Square. As I witnessed myself, the simultaneous presence of parents pushing babies in their buggies, alongside skating teenagers and grandparents, of so many people coming from so many different subcultures, was as unprecedented as it was moving. Its uniqueness lay also in the fact that this was a quiet and peaceful street protest: it involved no loudspeakers, no catchphrases, no 'master of ceremony' to agitate the public, no policing the crowds; despite not having been scheduled as such, this silent protest made a lot of noise -in fact, it was a street protest about the 'politics of presence' rather than about 'loud politics'. Journalist accounts claim that approximately 5000 people gathered outside the Parliament that afternoon, an extraordinary number to show up if one considers that this happened (a) spontaneously, (b) mainly by means of mobile and internet technology, (c) in the midst of the summer vacation, (d) on a Sunday afternoon, and (e) without any prompting from a political party. The symbolic value of the protest was made more pronounced once pieces of charred wood from the blaze were placed upon the Monument to the Unknown Soldier, an emblem of national pride. Nobody dared to remove it, reading in this a gesture of bereavement rather than of sacrilege of a national emblem.
The question of whether this protest was a one-off firecracker, contributing to the feel-good factor of the citizenry about themselves, or whether it actually meant that the civil society in Greece had been reinvigorated and solidified springs up. Can this environmental activist sensitivity be transformed to a state of 'sustainable mobilization'?
Political Firecrackers or Sustainable Mobilization?
A similar narrative of protest unfolded a few weeks after the blaze in Parnitha, following a fortnight of bushfires. The period of 18-30 August 2007 will remain indelibly carved in the collective psyche: Greece was hit by another wave of wildfires that ravaged vast acres of forest land and countryside, consumed scores of homes, people, livestock and forest animals and wiped entire communities off the map. This time it really was a 'national' disaster, leaving behind a trail of physical and personal devastation and inflicting incalculable damage on the social, economic and environmental life of the country for years to come.
On Sunday 26 August another wrathful SMS started to circulate, inviting Athenians to yet another street demonstration outside the Greek Parliament at Syntagma square. This time, the SMS, which was also circulated on the internet as a blog entry and email, read:
You let Greece burn to the ground. Why?
The blog 'anadasosi', which was particularly active during the arson in Parnitha, took responsibility for this SMS and created an online post prompting everyone to: The poster encouraged the Greek people to forward it via e-mail or SMS, to use it as a banner in their blog or site, to print it off and pass it around, and principally to attend the Wednesday protest either in Athens or elsewhere in Greece.
Although I found it difficult to judge, I estimated that this protest, which I also witnessed, was attended by anything between 8000 and 10,000 people. The crowd was so thick that Syntagma square -a centre point in Athens -was impenetrable. Once again, this was a silent protest, having no loudspeakers or party politics to demonstrate. When at some point, a group of protesters lifted up a banner, they were jeered only to be immediately cheered once they took it down. People came with their friends, their children and their pets, all of them clad in black, mourning for the lives and livelihoods lost, as well as for the loss of unique physical beauty. In my view, this time the protest was even more cross-sectional than the previous one, especially as far as age was concerned, although the presence of young people (20-and 30-something) was paramount; it was attended by people from different cultural and political backgrounds in equal measures, which indicates that a call to a commonly accepted purpose can effectively mobilize and reinvent the citizenry. The question, nevertheless, remains: was the late August 2007 protest, and the reactions it prompted, another instance of activist gymnastics fanned by the magnitude of disaster? Or, does it entail a new and healthy civil society that is alert about environmental harm?
Conclusions
Despite fears that the blaze in Parnitha and the August firestorms would cost the government of New Democracy the September 2007 elections, neither the government nor the PASOK Opposition party were penalized (Mavris, 2007: 12-13 ) -since in the collective mind, it is these two major parties that account for everything that has been happening in Greece for the past 20 years -and no landslides in voter behaviour occurred at that time.
How can this behaviour be explained and what does it say about civil society in Greece? It seems as if the people in the hit areas, once faced with such an unprecedented disaster, adopted a fatalistic attitude and rewarded the nanny state by voting for it. The emergence of a paternalistic governmental mechanism, which provided expost solutions (a 3000 euros financial compensation was immediately handed out to all those affected) to a crisis that should have never happened in the first place was sufficient for a large enough proportion of the Greek electorate (Kathimerini, 2007b) . This is not the first time such issues have become part of the public agenda. Back in 1998, and in the aftermath of another massive wildfire in the Athens basin, opinion polls assessed public attitudes regarding the blaze; 99 per cent of the people demanded that construction in the burnt forest land should be deemed illegal and all illegal constructions be demolished. Contrary to everyone's belief that the government of the day (PASOK), would legislate favourably for the environment, nothing such happened. Back then, another case of collective amnesia took over the Greek people who conveniently erased all memories of the conflagrations when the time came to cast their vote. How can such erratic behaviour be justified? This is a clear case of what Anne Krueger (1974) has called 'rent seeking', a practice whereby minority interest groups are better and more successful at lobbying for their interests in comparison to the majority of the people within a society, who do not pursue theirs. The result is that the government will yield power under the pressure exerted by these minority interests, so as not to lose any voters; in the meantime, the rest of the populace remains an idle spectator (erooster, 2007) .
Is there any hope for eventually attaining a strong political and environmental culture in a country where nobody protests against the lack of an autonomous Ministry for the Environment (in Greece, up until recently, there was a Ministry of Environment, Planning and Public Works; as a result, interest groups in the latter work against the former; this has now been replaced by the Ministry of Environment, Energy and Climatic Change under a PASOK Government) but will bring ordinary life to a standstill if any attempt is made against its evening entertainment? 8 To add insult to injury, many people in Greece have not learned to respect and care for the environment, as the pile of refuse after any given weekend in the countryside can attest. Research has also shown the heavy dependency of NGOs in Greece on the mass media for promoting their scope and rationale to the wider public (Panagiotopoulou, 2007) . The low level of encouragement for new members and support demonstrated by the Greek environmental organizations do not make things any easier (Tsaliki, 2003) . In addition, fire statistics indicate that during preelectoral periods, the number of incendiaries rises sharply (Kathimerini, 2007c) . For both major political parties, New Democracy and PASOK, nature and the environment have scored very low in their political agendas, considered as 'consumables' for the benefit of an outdated view of economic and tourist development (Kathimerini, 2007d) . This comes as no surprise if we consider that environmental NGOs end up doing the state's job for it; in this sense, the scientific input and activity of NGOs saves the official Greek state from embarrassment towards the EC (Botetzagias, 2006: 90) .
The Conservative government that came out of the September 2007 general elections, put forward an amendment before the Greek Parliament according to which there should be no constructions in forest land designated for reforestation, and in any such case, the construction will be deemed illegal and subsequently demolished (Kathimerini, 2007e) . It would seem that in the aftermath of the two street protests, the 'power of the many' actually resulted in positive official action. Although this is a step in the right direction, it still leaves a lot to be desired. 9 A true cynic would deconstruct the importance of both protests by suggesting that they were 'affairs of the heart', responses to a good cause initiated through new technologies, rather than part of an organized political agenda that is there to stay. Leaving the pieces of charred wood and ashes on the Unknown Soldier can also be read as a gesture of theatricality and hyperbolic excess, perfectly fit for a culture of sentimentalism as that entertained by the all-pervasive television culture in Greece. For, I wonder, where are all the protesters now? Following the mushrooming of blogs, several Facebook communities have been set up in Greece following the blazing summer of 2007, thus indicating that there is an ongoing public discourse regarding the reasons that led to the August fires. But, was that enough? Or was it merely a passing fad, which we then, collectively, forgot? The Greek public at large is still voting for the same parties and turns a blind eye when their fellow citizen encroaches on public land for personal reasons. This is an everyday 'rent-seeking' routine that has become standard practice and is now commonly accepted.
It is not enough, therefore, to protest online and offline against the inefficacy of the political system, no matter how noble the cause. Greece is a paradox of a country, as political displacement goes hand-in-hand with high voter turnout, and the availability for volunteerism and collective action is equally assorted by vested interests that do not want to be disturbed. Unless online technologies are assorted by a supportive, environmentally friendly political culture, the street protests discussed herein will remain fancy activist pyrotechnics, aimed at adding to the collective feel-good factor.
Finally, despite the significance of the role of online technologies in mobilizing the people of Athens in December 2008, when an unprecedented number of street riots (involving extensive looting and arson attacks) and protests took the country by surprise after the police shot dead a 16-year-old Athenian youth, I believe that these events are worthy of their own detailed and careful analysis (Komninos and Vamvakas, forthcoming; Tsaliki, 2009) ; in this respect, the December 2008 street riots should not be conflated with the summer 2007 peaceful street protests for they represent different social chain reactions. The fact that in both cases the role of online technologies was paramount in mobilizing the public is just one facet of a complex reality, one that requires a wider contextual culture to sustain the groundswell of mobilization created by ICTs. The ongoing environmental disintegration and harm 10 indicates that environmental citizenship in Greece is still lacking, and that the impact of online technology for political engagement is limited unless there is the appropriate contextual environment to nurture it.
Notes
1 This is a shortened version of a paper presented in the Young People, New Technologies and Political Engagement conference, University of Surrey, 24-25 July 2007. 2 The bibliography on this point is very rich; see among others, Bennett, 2003; Clark and Themudo, 2006; Comor, 2001; Diebert, 2000; Hacker and van Dijk, 2000; Juris, 2005; Loader, 2004. 3 If truth be said, the popularity of reality and celebrity culture is not unique in the Greek context, but permeates other western societies and democracies with strong civil societies. 4 Hence, the detected rapid proliferation of environmental NGOs may under no circumstances be equated with a reinforcement of civil society in Greece (Botetzagias, 2006: 74) . 8 Back in the early 1990s, the PASOK government tried to regulate nightlife in Athens and stipulated that all night venues be closed by 3 a.m. Faced with an enormous public uproar, the government was forced to retreat. 9 There are three grey areas: 1. only new illegal constructions in burnt forest land are legislated, leaving previous ones unscathed; 2. existing illegal constructions in forest land have been left out; 3. only burnt forest areas due for reforestation are affected, which does not provide for changes in land status after a blaze (hence construction becomes legal). 10 An ironic case of déjà vu occurred, yet again, in August 2009, as blazing fires out of control consumed vast areas of forest land across Attica, an environmental disaster massively worse than that of the summer of 2007, and led to yet another round of general elections in October 2009; as of 4 October, there is a PASOK administration in Greece, with a robust commitment to green energy. Having said that, the latest destruction of about 50,000 acres of land in Attica was not met by any mass protest, peaceful or otherwise. Instead, a couple of months following the disaster, grazing herds of sheep and goats, together with the gradual planting of olive trees -the first step towards revamping forest land into land that is cultivated -undermined any possibility for forest regeneration in Attica, and leaves a lot to be desired.
